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JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADmINISTRATIVE ACTION. By Louis L. Jaffe.
Little, Brown and Company, Boston. 1965. Pp. xvi, 792. $20.00.
A book with the depth and scope of Professor Jaffe's recently pub-
lished work on judicial control of administrative action is not an easy
one to review. While one is tempted to write a parallel work of com-
mentary and criticism, such a task is beyond the scope of a review;
anything less, however, seems light and superficial when put beside the
work commented upon. Nevertheless, the following is offered for in-
terested readers.
Professor Jaffe's book was not written in the tradition of legal trea-
tises which present a detailed, systematic, and tightly organized treat-
ment of a subject. On the contrary, though he refers to the work as a
treatise, the volume grew out of a number of separately published law
review articles, supplemented by four new chapters. Although some
integration of the articles has been accomplished, the total impression
created is more that of a volume of provocative legal essays than of the
structured and sometimes dogmatic presentation endemic to treatises.
Revisions made in the articles previously published are of interest and
of particular value in reflecting a judgment matured both by recon-
sideration and by a discerning receptiveness to criticisms directed at
the previously stated views.
This is not to say that comparisons may not be made between Pro-
fessor Jaffe's work and the well-known four-volume treatise by Pro-
fessor Davis. Indeed, Professor Davis has already furnished a fairly
detailed and annotated list of his disagreements with Jaffe.' Aside from
these specific substantive issues upon which they are divided and the
more limited coverage of Jaffe's book, the primary difference between
the two works is in their tone. As those familiar with Professor Davis'
writings are aware, he is inclined to categorize decisions as right or
wrong, depending upon how well they conform to the scheme he cre-
ated when organizing his treatise. Jaffe on the other hand assiduously
avoids positions which have any aspect of dogmatism, with the fre-
quent consequence that while the problem has been exposed in all of its
delicate aspects, the reader is left to make his own resolution of the
issues. Thus, while Professor Davis' condemnation of the decision in




International Longshoremen's Union v. Boyd2 leaves no doubt that he
considers it an erratic and unfortunate response of the Supreme Court
in dealing with problems of ripeness,3 Jaffe's tempered treatment leaves
his readers with no more guidance than that the decision is one which
he has found hard to accept.' For Jaffe there can be no formula for
preventing "industry orientation" of agencies, or by which it is decided
whether a board or officer should be made subject to Presidential re-
moval, or by which rule or policy-making functions should be separated
from adjudication.' Although review by way of trial de novo of an
administrative order made after a full and fair hearing seems to him at
first sight wasteful and almost contradictory, he concludes that its
operative effect may in fact have redeeming value.' He even refuses to
take a firm position with respect to public actions in the federal
sphere,7 despite the fact that he has assumed the role of a reformer in-
terested in changing the law governing standing to maintain public
actions.
The introductory comments, in which he passes some generalized
judgments upon the administrative process, are among the more in-
teresting portions of Jaffe's book. He asserts that administration in-
volves policy-making, and policy-making is politics-a politics which
cannot be hidden by the pretence that expertise provides an objective
determinant of policy.8 He doubts, however, that administrative agen-
cies can plan effectively because they lack the essential political force
and become too involved with day-to-day details of their work.' The
planning that is done is likely to be oriented toward problems which
were experienced in the past, rather than toward those which might be
anticipated in the future. 10 He believes that in recent years the re-
formers who supported the development of the administrative process
have become disillusioned," and leads his readers into the considera-
tion of the subject with the concession that administrative agencies
have limitations which give rise to a picture having disturbing as-
pects.12
2 347 U.S. 222 (1954).
23 DAvis, ADMINISTRATIV LAW § 21.08, at 184 (1958).
'P. 415.
r P. 27.
P. 99. But see Wollett, The Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals After Nine
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In the way of substance, one familiar with Jaffe's writing notes with
interest that his revised views on the matter of primary jurisdiction do
not leave him in the sharp opposition to that doctrine which he once
expressed in a still provocative law review article.13 In keeping with
the tone of the entire book, he will not make the dogmatic assumption
that effective economic regulations must be exclusively judicial or that
the premises of the anti-trust laws are more in the public interest than
those underlying the regulatory statutes. 14 For those who have the
interest, or more likely, those who are compelled by the necessities of
litigation or research, a detailed discussion of certiorari and mandamus
may be found in a chapter on the system of judicial review." For the
historically minded, there is also a dividend in the chapter on sovereign
immunity.16
Jaffe's substantive comments do create some puzzles. For example,
his defense of a broad application of discretionary governmental im-
munity from tort liability17 seems to be at war with his advocacy of
rules liberalizing the recognition of public actions brought by tax-
payers, citizens, or consumers.' s I should think one would be more
likely to tolerate challenge to and possible conflict with official policy
determinations in actions brought by those who had suffered specific,
identifiable, and unique injuries than to allow such challenges to be
made by parties whose interest is no different from that of any other
member of the body politic.
Also somewhat surprising is Jaffe's praise for the jurisdictional fact
doctrine of Crowell v. Benson,'" which he defends against what he calls
an overly stringent but logical critique.2" It is true that the doctrine
provides an implement in the Court's armory which might be used to
meet an exceptional situation. But it is an implement so fashioned as
to be useful only in a few very exceptional cases, and even in those,
one the effectiveness of which is easily equaled by other techniques less
disturbing to the general relationship between courts and agencies in
matters of judicial review.
The closing chapters of the book contain what is probably the closest
and most detailed published treatment of problems of judicial stays
"Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction Reconsidered. The Anti-Trust Laws, 102 U. PA.






"285 U.S. 22 (1932).
:'P. 641.
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pending administrative action and judicial stays of administrative ac-
tion pending judicial review. So exhaustive is the treatment that one
is left wondering how all that precedes it could have been compressed
into 650 pages.
The critical comments in this review should not be taken as an at-
tempt to slight the value of what is an extremely important book in the
field of administrative law. Jaffe's book is no substitute for Davis'
treatise, but it does not appear to have been intended to serve as such.
Indeed, it seems likely that even for the subjects treated by Jaffe, the
Davis work will remain the favorite of practitioners and judges seeking
firm and unequivocal expressions of opinion as to what the law is and
what the law should be. But for the student and the scholar the less
positive, the less assertive work of Jaffe is invaluable as an introduction
to an area of law in which, as demonstrated by the conflict of opinions
displayed in law review articles on administrative law, there is a great
diversity of opinion and considerable variation in approach. It should
be mentioned that there is available a soft cover student edition of the
book, which has been abridged by elimination of the last three chapters
of the complete work.
Cornelius J. Peck*
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